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Abstract: Side channel attacks can be effectively addressed at the circuit level by using 
dynamic differential logic styles. A key problem is to guarantee a balanced ca-
pacitive load at the differential outputs of the logic gates. The main contribu-
tion to this load is the capacitance associated with the routing between cells. 
This paper describes a novel design methodology to route a design in which 
multiple differential pairs are present. The methodology is able to route 20K+ 
differential routes. The differential routes are always routed in adjacent tracks 
and the parasitic effects between the two wires of each differential pair are 
balanced. The methodology is developed on top of a commercially available 
EDA tool. It has been developed as part of a secure digital design flow to pro-
tect security applications against Differential Power Analysis attacks. Experi-
mental results indicate that a perfect protection is attainable with the aid of the 
proposed differential routing strategy. 
Key words: Place & Route, Differential Pair, Differential Power Analysis, Side Channel 
Attacks 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Much design effort is spent in developing secure protocols and selecting 
strong encryption algorithms to achieve the security level envisioned in the 
specifications of the smart card application. Any security application how-
ever, is only as safe as its weakest link. Information related with the physical 
implementation of the device, such as variations in time delay and power 
consumption, has been used repeatedly to find the secret key in so-called 
Side Channel Attacks [1]. Especially the Differential Power Analysis (DPA) 
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[2] is of great concern as it is very effective in finding the secret key and can 
be mounted quickly with off-the-shelf devices. The attack is based on the 
fact that logic operations have power characteristics that depend on the input 
data. It relies on statistical analysis to retrieve the information from the 
power consumption that is correlated to the secret key. 
At first, DPA has been thwarted with ad hoc countermeasures, which es-
sentially concealed the supply current variations. Examples are for instance 
the addition of random power consuming operations or a current sink. Yet, 
the attacks have evolved and become more and more sophisticated. To ad-
dress the problem, countermeasures need to be provided at different design 
abstraction levels. At the algorithmic level, an example is masking [3]. This 
technique prevents intermediate variables to depend on an easily accessible 
subset of the secret key.  
Only recently, at the circuit level, dedicated hardware techniques have 
been proposed [4],[5]. Instead of concealing or decorrelating the side chan-
nel information, these techniques aim at not creating any side channel in-
formation. Goal of these countermeasures is to balance the power consump-
tion of the logic gates. When the power consumption of the smallest building 
block is a constant and independent of the signal activity, no information is 
leaked through the power supply and a DPA is impossible.  
Both in the synchronous [4] and in the asynchronous [5] approach, dy-
namic differential logic is employed. In this logic, every signal transition, 
also e.g. a degenerated 0 to 0 transition, is represented with an actual switch-
ing event, in which the logic gate charges a capacitance. Besides a 100% 
switching factor, it is essential in order to achieve constant power consump-
tion that a fixed amount of charge is used per transition. This means that the 
load capacitances at the differential output should be matched. The load ca-
pacitance has 3 components: the intrinsic output capacitance, the intercon-
nect capacitance and the intrinsic input capacitance of the load. Through a 
careful layout of the standard cells, the intrinsic input capacitances of a gate 
can be matched, as well as the intrinsic output capacitances. Yet with shrink-
ing channel-length of the transistors, the share of the interconnect capaci-
tance in the total load capacitance increases and the interconnect capacitan-
ces will become the dominant capacitance. Hence, the issue of matching the 
interconnect capacitances of the signal wires is crucial for the countermea-
sures to succeed [4],[5]. To our knowledge, this publication is the first to 
address this problem. 
As we will derive in section 3, the best strategy to achieve matched inter-
connect capacitances is to route the output signals differentially. It is impor-
tant to note that in this manuscript, differential routing denotes that the 2 
output signals are at all times routed in adjacent tracks. Yet, this is the very 
opposite of current commercial cross-talk aware routers, which precisely 
Place and Route for Secure Standard Cell Design 145
 
avoid running wires in parallel. As a response, we have elaborated a tech-
nique to force commercial EDA tools to route multiple differential pairs. In 
this technique, each output pair is routed as 1 ‘fat’ wire, which has among 
other characteristics the width of 2 parallel wires. Afterwards, the fat wires 
are split into the 2 differential lines.  
Differential pair and shielded routing has been available through shape-
based routers whose antecedents are in the PCB domain, where electrical 
constraints are historically more dominant. However, router performance 
and completion rate degrade rapidly with increasing number of such con-
straints. Gridded routers, with both routing resource representation and heu-
ristic search optimized for speed and capacity, are very difficult to adapt for 
connection of ‘wide wires’ or ‘co-constrainted’ wires [6]. Recently, shielded 
routing capability has been migrated to gridded routers. We cannot directly 
use this approach for differential pair routing because (1) the two parallel 
wires are not VDD or VSS line (that are typically used for shielding); (2) the 
spacing between two differential wires will be larger due to the shielded sig-
nal wire in the middle; and (3) the two differential wires cannot be guaran-
teed to have similar length. Therefore, we present a way to work around tool 
limitations in section 3. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, a place 
& route approach is developed in order to thwart DPA. Section 3 discusses 
the differential routing technique. In section 4, an experiment is setup in 
which the technique is applied to route the DES encryption algorithm and 
results of a DPA are provided. Finally a conclusion will be formulated. 
2. BALANCING INTERCONNECT LOADS 
2.1 Given Information  
A standard cell of a dynamic differential cell library has 2 differential 
outputs A and A’, which connect to k differential input pairs {(I1, I1’), ... (Ik, 
Ik’)}. Each standard cell has a balanced design. This means that (1) the in-
trinsic output capacitances Co,A and Co,A’ seen at outputs A and A’ are equal; 
that (2) the intrinsic input capacitances Ci,Ij and Ci,Ij’ seen at inputs Ij and Ij’ 
are equal; and that (3) the drive strengths at output A and A’ are equal. The 
standard cell has exactly 1 switching event per cycle. This event is always 
the same and consists of 2 transitions: (1) in the evaluation phase: both out-
puts are at 1 and 1 output discharges to 0; and (2) in the precharge phase: 1 
output is at 1; the other output is at 0 and is charged to 1. 
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2.2 Place & Route Constraints  
2.2.1 Match Load Capacitance 
In addition to engaging in 1 charging event per clock cycle, it is manda-
tory for input independent power consumption that the load capacitance is a 
constant. The differential standard cell has a load capacitance at each output. 
Since only 1 output undergoes a transition per switching event, the total load 
at output A should match the total load at output A’: CA = CA’. This, as can 
be seen in Figure 1, can be restated as: Co,A + Cw,A + Ci,I1 + … Ci,Ik = Co,A’ + 
Cw,A’ + Ci,I1’ + … Ci,Ik’, which can be reduced to Cw,A = Cw,A’ because of the 
balanced standard cell design. This means that the Steiner routing tree over 
{A, I1, ... Ik} must have the same total capacitance as the Steiner routing tree 











Co:  intrinsic output capacitance 
Cw:  interconnect capacitance 





Figure 1. Load capacitance decomposition. 
It is not necessary to balance the routing tree over {A, I1, … Ik} with the 
routing tree over {B, Im, … Is} (where A and B are the outputs of two differ-
ent gates). For the total encryption module to have constant power consump-
tion, it is sufficient that the power consumption of each building block is 
input independent. There is no need for mutually matching the routing trees.  
Cross-talk, which is the phenomenon of noise induced on one wire by a 
signal switching on a neighboring wire, influences not only the delay, but 
also the power consumption. Therefore the pair of interconnects need to be 
routed with the same capacitance and with control over any cross-talk. 
2.2.2 Match Source-Sink Delays  
An attacker will analyze all information available from the power con-
sumption. He/she will not settle for the total charge per switching event, but 
will trace the instantaneous power consumption. To assure that only minor 
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instantaneous current variations exist between different switching events, 
each pair of differential routes should have a constant source-sink delay: the 
delay from A to Ii must be equal to the delay from A' to Ii’ for each i = 1, ... 
k. It is not necessary that the delay from A to Ii is equal to the delay from A 
to Ij (where A is connected to the inputs Ii of gate B and Ij of gate C), nor that 
the delay from A to Ii is equal to the delay from B to Ij, (where the gates A 
and B are connected to the inputs Ii and Ij of gate C).  
2.2.3  Miscellaneous Constraints  
Implementations of encryption algorithm generally require 20K+ gates. 
This means that 20K+ differential routes must be balanced. It might be pos-
sible to only implement the most sensitive parts of the encryption module 
and reduce this number. Yet, the size of the problem will not be reduced 
with an order of magnitude. 
The differential routing procedure must complete the missing part of a 
secure digital design flow [7]. This design flow does not restrict the fanout, 
which is the number of gates a gate connects to.  
2.3 Place & Route Approach 
If two gates are connected with parallel routes that are at all times in ad-
jacent tracks and on the same layers, then since independent of the place-
ment, the geometric distances are balanced, the two routes have to a first or-
der the same capacitances and the same delays. Yet, this is not completely 
true because both nets may have different parasitics and cross-talk effects.  
Parasitic effects are caused by the distributed resistance of the intercon-
nect and by the distributed capacitance of the interconnect to the substrate 
and to neighboring wires in other metal layers. Though aside from process 
variations, these effects are equal for both nets. The resistance is the same 
since both interconnects have the same number of vias and have the same 
length in each metal layer. The capacitance to the other layers is ideally the 
same since in general the length of the differential route is orders of magni-
tude larger then the pitch between the 2 differential routes and one can there-
fore argue that both nets travel in the same environment. Making every other 
metal layer a ground plane would completely control the capacitance to other 
layers. Yet this would not only reduce the solution space but also increase 
the total capacitance.  
Cross-talk effects are caused by the distributed capacitance to adjacent 
wires in the same metal layer. Routing the two output nets in parallel re-
moves the uncertainty of one neighbor: during a switching event only one 
output line switches, the other output line remains quiet. All uncertainty can 
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be removed by shielding the differential routes on either side with a VDD or 
VSS line. Besides the loss in routing tracks, it will also be hard to get multi-
ple sets of 4 routes into and out a standard cell. Yet, reserving 1 grid line out 
of 3 upfront for a power line reduces the problem again to routing 2 differen-
tial lines. Note that the approach of alternating signal lines and quiet power 
lines has been shown to produce predictable interconnect parasitics [8]. Al-
ternatively, the cross-talk effects can be controlled by merely increasing the 
distance between different differential routes. This can easily be done with 
the differential routing methodology we will present now. 
3. DIFFERENTIAL ROUTING  
The methodology that we propose is to abstract the differential pair as a 
single fat wire. The differential design is routed with the fat wire and at the 
end the fat wire is decomposed into the differential wire.  
3.1 Basic Ideas  
3.1.1 Fat Wire Definition 
The fat wire covers the two differential wires. The centerline of the fat 
wire is the centerline between the two differential wires. The width of the fat 
wire Wf is set by the summation of the pitch Pn of the normal wires and 2 
times half the width of the normal wire Wn: Wf = Pn + 2Wn/2. The pitch, 
which is the distance between the centerline of two adjacent wires, Pf of the 
fat wires is set by the summation of 2 times half the width of the fat wire and 
the desirable distance ∆ between the fat wires: Pf = 2Wf/2 + ∆. The distance 
∆ can be made large to reduce cross-talk effects. The minimum spacing rules 
do not change.  
3.1.2 Transformation  
After place & route with the fat wire, the resulting design must be trans-
formed into the final differential design. The transformation consists of 2 
translations of the fat wire and a width reduction to the normal width. 
Since the centerline between two normal wires is the centerline of the fat 
wire, a translation of the fat wire in the positive direction will result in one 
differential line and a negative translation in the in the other line. The trans-
lation must occur both in the horizontal and the vertical direction. As shown 
in Figure 2, a consistent shift of all segments of the fat wire with a ∆X in the 
X direction and a ∆Y in the Y direction will result in one wire; a shift with a 
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-∆X and a -∆Y in the other wire. The shifts ∆X and ∆Y are half the pitch 







Figure 2. Fat routes (left); translation operation (middle); and differential routes (right).  
The resulting differential wires have the same number of vias and seg-
ments. Each segment has the same length in both wires and is routed over 
the same number of wires in the other metal layers. As a result, both lines 
have the same distributed resistances and parasitic capacitances to the sub-
strate and to the routes in the other metal layers. 
3.2 Practical Aspects  
This section discusses some of the practical issues we have come across. 
While these issues are independent of the tool, the guidelines presented are 
for Silicon Ensemble [9], which we have used as the place & route tool. 
3.2.1 Restrictions on Differential Standard Cell 
As can be seen in Figure 2, the vias are all aligned on a positive tilted di-
agonal. The in- and output pins of the standard cells must also be aligned 
likewise and with the same offsets. The upper pin is the pin associated with 
the true net, the lower with the false net. Only then the translation can be 
done in a consistent way.  
3.2.2 Fat Wire Definition 
Silicon Ensemble extends routes with at least half the width at their end-
points. Because of the increased width, the fat wire extends too far at its 
endpoints and covers an area where there is no actual normal route. As a re-
sult, spacing errors are generated for certain patterns of wires, which are 
only virtual errors. To address this problem, the original normal wire is 
routed on a large grid that has been defined such that there will be no spac-
ing violations after splitting. Doubling the original grid pitches results in 
such a grid. Now, the .lef library database [10], which contains all the infor-
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mation that is relevant for the router tool, such as routing layers, via rules, 
grid definition, spacing rules and abstract views of the standard cells, can be 
left unchanged except for a new grid definition and the abstract views of the 
cells with fat pin information. Note that from now on, we will route a normal 
wire, but we will continue to refer to this wire as the fat wire.  
3.2.3 Grid Definition 
To facilitate the placement, the height and width of a standard cell should 
be a multiple of the horizontal and vertical pitch respectively. In addition, 
since we can only route on the grid the pins should be situated on the grid 
crossings. The most straightforward is to take the pitch of the fat design a 
multiple of the original grid. The minimum pitch between the fat wires is 2 
times the pitch between the normal wires.  
We defined the grid and the standard cells as follows: (1) the horizontal 
and vertical pitches of the fat grid are double the ones of the normal grid; 
and (2) the normal and fat grids have an offset of half their pitch length in 
both the horizontal and vertical direction. With this definition all require-
ments previously derived are fulfilled: (1) the standard cell dimensions are 
multiples of the horizontal and vertical pitch of the fat and the normal grid; 
(2) the fat pins are situated on the crossings of the fat grid, the differential 
pins on the crossings of the normal one; and (3) the differential pins can ob-
tained by shifting the fat pin with half a pitch length of the normal grid in 
both the horizontal and vertical direction. 
3.2.4 Non-preferred Routing Direction  
If the fat wire takes a turn in a metal layer, the wires of a differential 
route may cross in the same metal layer and result in an electric short be-
tween both wires. This however, can only happen if a metal layer is used in 
the vertical and the horizontal direction. Even though each metal layer has a 
preferred routing direction, this does not guarantee that the routing layer is 
only used in that direction. This required us to force Silicon Ensemble to 
only route in the preferred direction.  
3.2.5 Transformation Procedure 
The transformation procedure consists of two parts: (1) parsing the 
placed and routed fat design to reflect the differential design and (2) reading 
in the differential library database. The differential ‘diff.lef’ library database 
contains the normal grid definition, normal wire definition, normal via defi-
nition and the differential gates with differential pin information. 
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The wires in the routed ‘fat.def’ design file are described as lines be-
tween 2 points and vias are assigned as points. The wire width and via char-
acteristics are defined in the .lef library database. As a result the parser only 
needs to translate the (X,Y) coordinates of the end points without to worry 
about the wire characteristics. The translation is done by (1) repeating each 
statement that defines a net; (2) attaching the first statement to the positive 
pins and translating it in a positive (∆X,∆Y) direction; and (3) attaching the 
second statement to the negative pins and translate it in a negative (∆X,∆Y) 
direction. Recall that ∆X and ∆Y are half the pitch lengths of the normal 
wires in the X and Y direction. Besides the translation of the nets, each fat 
gate in the ‘fat.def’ file is substituted by its corresponding differential gate.  
Figure 3 summarizes the differential routing methodology. 
 
fa t.v p lace  
&   










Figure 3. Differential routing methodology. 
3.2.6 Differential and Single Ended Routing 
Up to now, we only presented a methodology to route a design of which 
all wires are differential. It is however possible to combine single ended 
routing and differential routing. There are 3 options. The design can be 
routed in 2 stages. First the differential lines are routed, and subsequently 
with a new library database the single ended lines are routed, or visa versa. 
The design can also be routed concurrently by defining the fat routes or the 
single ended routes as nondefault routing rules. Or, one could route every 
wire as a fat wire and subsequently transform the single ended signals into a 
single line and the differential signals into 2 lines. The last option is not pre-
ferred if the single ended routes are in the majority and area constraints are 
tight. 
3.3 Design Example 
Figure 4 demonstrates the differential routing technique. The figure 
shows an arbitrary placed and routed design consisting of 7 differential 
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gates. At the left, the result is shown of the fat routing. At the right, the result 
after transformation is shown. Each fat wire is replaced by 2 normal wires.  
                     
Figure 4. Example: fat (left); and differential design (right). 
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
In this section, we compare two dynamic differential implementations of 
the DES algorithm [11]. One implementation uses the differential routing 
technique described above. For the other implementation, we use the default 
standard cell route as generated by the EDA router. We mounted a DPA on 
both differential implementations. We have chosen DES, because much re-
search has focused on both the implementation and prevention of DPA on 
DES. The first subsection presents the basic procedures of the DPA. Then 
the experimental setup is discussed and implementation details are given. 
The last subsection covers the experimental results. Please note that a DPA 
attack on a regular (non differential) standard cell implementation is de-
scribed in [4]. 
4.1 Differential Power Analysis  
A DPA attack is carried out in several stages. First, the power consump-
tion is recorded for a large number of encryptions. This is done by measur-
ing the instantaneous supply current. Next, the measurements are partitioned 
over 2 sets based on a so-called selection function, which uses a guess on a 
subset of the secret key to make its decision. At the end, the difference is 
calculated between the typical supply currents of the 2 sets. The difference is 
referred to as Differential Trace (DT). If the DT has noticeable peaks, the 
guess on the secret key was correct.  
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The selection function is a behavioral model of the encryption module 
and predicts 1 state bit of the module. If the secret key has been guessed cor-
rectly, the outcome of the selection function is always equal to the actual 
state bit and is therefore correlated with the power consumption of the logic 
operations that are affected by the state bit. Measurement errors and the 
power consumption of the other logic operations are uncorrelated. As a re-
sult, the DT will approach the effect of the state bit on the power consump-
tion. If on the other hand the guess on the secret key was incorrect, the result 
of the selection function is uncorrelated with the state bit and the DT will 
approach 0. 
4.2 Experimental Setup 
The experimental setup is depicted in Figure 5 [4]. The module forms 
part of the DES encryption algorithm. Based on 4 bits of the left plaintext PL, 
6 bits of the right plaintext PR and 6 bits of the secret key K, it calculates 4 
bits of the left ciphertext CL. The selection function D(K,C), which is used in 
the DPA, predicts the first bit of the register that stores the left plaintext PL. 
















1st bit of PL. 
K guessed.  
C known. clk CR 
 
Figure 5. Experimental setup: DPA on submodule of the last round in the DES-algorithm [4]. 
The experimental setup is a necessary and sufficient subset of the DES 
encryption algorithm on which a DPA can be mounted [4]. The algorithm 
has been reduced to this setup such that it becomes computationally feasible 
to simulate it with Hspice. High-level power estimators, such as cycle accu-
rate simulators, cannot be used. A DPA attack uses statistical methods that 
can detect very small power variations, which are plainly neglected by high-
level power estimators. Furthermore, in order to retrieve as much hidden in-
formation as possible, an attacker will sample several times per clock cycle.  
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4.3 Implementation Details 
We have implemented the module in Wave Dynamic Differential Logic 
(WDDL) [7]. WDDL is a logic style that has dynamic differential behavior. 
Yet, it is implemented with static complementary CMOS logic, which is the 
default logic style used in standard cell libraries. In WDDL, static CMOS 
standard cells are combined to form secure compound standard cells, which 
have a reduced power signature. It has the advantage that it can readily be 
implemented without the investment in a custom designed standard cell li-
brary. We used a commercially available standard cell library developed for 
a 0.18µm, 1.8V CMOS technology. A WDDL gate actually is a double-
height cell that consists of 2 abutted static CMOS standard cells, which are 
extended with filler cells in which the pin placement requirements are ful-
filled. A WDDL gate does not have balanced input capacitances, nor bal-
anced output capacitances. The filler cells could also incorporate additional 
capacitances such that the intrinsic capacitances become balanced. The im-
plementation consists of 194 WDDL gates, which are 440 actual static 
CMOS standard cells.  
Two different layouts have been created. Both designs have exact the 
same floor plan and cell placement. The difference is in the routing proce-
dure. One implementation, which we will call the ‘regular route’-design, has 
been routed without any constraints or special techniques. The other, which 
we will call the ‘differential pair route’-design, has been routed with the dif-
ferential routing technique described in this manuscript. 
Place & route has been done in Silicon Ensemble version 5.3. Row utili-
zation and aspect ratio are set at 0.80 and 1 respectively. Layout-to-netlist, in 
which transistors and layout parasitics are extracted, is done with Virtuoso. 
Simulations are done in Hspice, with the transient increment set at 10ps. The 
clock frequency of the circuit is chosen at 125MHz, and therefore 800 
‘measurement’ samples are made per clock cycle. The clock and input sig-
nals are driven by cascaded inverters in order to provide realistic data and 
clock signals. The power consumption of the additional input circuitry is 
excluded from the measurements. In total, 2000 clock cycles have been 
simulated with a random input at the plaintext PL and PR, and with a fixed 
secret key K, equal to 46.  
4.4 Experimental Results 
Silicon Ensemble required 8 and 3 CPU seconds on a SUN ULTRA 5 to 
route without any violations the regular route and the differential pair route 
respectively. It took 0.85 CPU seconds to parse and create the final differen-
tial netlist. Note that many floorplan settings can be evaluated; only the final 
Place and Route for Secure Standard Cell Design 155
 
design should be parsed. To have a comparison, we have also made an at-
tempt to use Cadence Chip Assembly Router version 11.0.06 [12] to route 
the placed design. This is one of the commercially available tools that has 
the capability of routing differential pairs. Only the 442 internal nets have 
been defined as 221 differential pairs. In total, 100 iterations have been per-
formed. This required 7 hrs 56 min and 33 sec in CPU time without generat-
ing a completely routed result. It still had 972 conflicts and 125 unconnected 
nets.  
Figure 6 and Figure 7 show 2 histograms in which the internal intercon-
nect capacitances of the regular route and the differential pair route are com-
pared. The capacitance per net was reported directly from Silicon Ensemble 
using Simcap. Figure 6 depicts the distribution of the ratio between the 
capacitance at the true signal net and the capacitance at the corresponding 
false signal net. The variation between the capacitances at the differential 
nets is up to a factor 4 for the regular route procedure. On the other hand, the 
differential pair route procedure does not show any variation. In fact, the tool 
always returned exact the same values.  
 
Figure 6. Ratio between interconnect capacitances at true and false nets. 
The distributions of the absolute values of the capacitances, which are 
shown in Figure 7 are very much similar between the 2 routing procedures. 
This indicates that the mean power consumption and the time delay of the 2 
implementations will be alike. 
In the transient simulation, the mean energy consumption per clock cycle 
is 42.72pJ and 44.21pJ for the regular route and the differential pair route 
respectively. The normalized energy deviation, which specifies the absolute 
range of the variation on the energy consumption per cycle, is 1% for the 
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regular route and 0.7% for the differential pair route. The normalized stan-
dard deviation is 0.2% and 0.1% respectively. 
 
Figure 7. Absolute interconnects capacitances. 
Figure 8 shows DTs from the DPA on our transient simulation. For each 
implementation, 2 DTs are shown: the one from the correct secret key guess 
and one from an arbitrary incorrect secret key guess. For transparency of the 
figure, the DTs of the other incorrect key guesses have been omitted. The 
omitted DTs are in accordance with the one shown. The differential pair 
routing has been effective in reducing the peaks in the DT of the correct se-
cret key. Compared to the regular routing, the differential pair route achieves 
a complete reduction. 
 
Figure 8. Differential trace for correct and arbitrary incorrect key guess. 
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Figure 9 shows the peak-to-peak value of the differential traces of the se-
cret key guesses. For the regular routed design, the DT of the secret key 
stands out. On the other hand, for the differential pair routed design, the DT 
does not reveal the secret key.  
Several approaches, which we have mentioned throughout the paper, 
such as for instance shielded lines or a larger pitch, balanced intrinsic capaci-
tances and ground planes, are still available to improve the results. These 
options all have in common that they are not for free: one requires more de-
sign time, the other more area, etc. This is typically for security applications, 
where the higher the level of security is aspired, the more expensive the im-
plementation will be. Yet, note also that we have performed a perfect attack 
with perfect measurement results. In real life, many factors, such as other 
circuitry, noise, decoupling, sample frequency, jitter, etc. will influence final 
result. The more the attacker is willing to invest in his measurement setup, 
the better his results may be. 
 
Figure 9. Peak-to-peak value of differential traces. 
It does not come as a surprise that the secret key is still detectable in the 
regular routed design, even though the cycle-to-cycle variation on the power 
consumption is a mere 1%. DPA is a very powerful attack that, as we men-
tioned before, will reveal apparent insignificant power differences. Therefore 
it is also necessary to proof the resistance of a technique against DPA with 
the results of an actual DPA and not to rely on any form of visual inspection 
of the power consumption behavior.  
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
We have presented a methodology to route multiple differential wires be-
tween secure dynamic differential standard cells. In the methodology, a wire 
code is assigned that abstracts the differential pair as a single fat wire. Sub-
sequently, the router is run using this fat wire and at the end the fat wire is 
decomposed back into the 2 wires. Experimental results have shown that a 
differential design is routed 2.6 times faster with this methodology compared 
with the case that the same differential design is routed without any con-
straints. The differential routing effectively helps in controlling the parasitic 
effects between the two wires of each differential pair. Experimental results 
show that the differential pair routing is an essential technique to success-
fully thwart the DPA.  
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